Unclaimed Sorrow

Suppose there is an intervention focusing on sorrow. Depression is an attitude or emotion that resides in a self; loss is an event that happens in the world. Sorrow is positioned somewhere in between depression and loss, between the self and the world. Sorrow is a personal response to loss, but sorrow is also what makes loss personal. I don’t think I’m cutting things too finely here. I’m looking for words that haven’t already been claimed by psychotherapy.

Depression is a formal diagnostic category; a syndrome, or cluster of interrelated symptoms; a disorder. Questionnaires have been devised for evaluating whether someone is clinically depressed and how severe that depression is. Medications have been designed to enhance the synaptic responsiveness of depressives’ brains by increasing the neurotransmitter uptake rate. Various psychotherapeutic techniques are used in the treatment of depression.

Loss is a life event that can trigger the onset of various undesirable emotional responses: anxiety, mourning, insecure attachment, anomie, anger, depression. People who have experienced a loss can be treated preventively, helping them work through the usual emotional sequlae until they re-establish a post-loss equilibrium: grieving programs, programs for children whose parents are going through a divorce, programs for employees who are “let go.” The life histories of people who are experiencing anxiety, anger and depression can be evaluated to identify whether loss may be at the root of the problem. Sometimes loss can only be inferred: something in childhood that has itself been lost to memory. Lacanian analysts trace psychiatric disorder to a primal loss of plenitude, a loss that never happened in reality.

Sorrow hasn’t been claimed by psychotherapy. It’s an emotionally charged and profound word, associated more with religion and poetry than with diagnosis and treatment. The word isn’t heard in everyday conversation. People who say they’re sorry are usually referring to minor violations of politesse rather than deep regret or guilt; people rarely say they’re sorrowful. Sorrow is a noun, like depression and loss, which might reify it as a thing. Sorrow is an oppressively painful atmosphere or force field that permeates everything, welling up from a gash that’s been ripped in the heart, flowing out from a gash that’s been ripped in the world. Sorrow is something so painful we’re reluctant to let ourselves be vulnerable to it ever happening to us. Sorrow has been exiled from our culture and our discourse.

Sorrow doesn’t prescribe how it’s supposed to be understood, or experienced, or treated, or cured. There is no database, no drug, no ten-step program. No a priori tacit agreement is established between therapist and client as to roles, procedures, self-definitions. It’s time: the terms “therapist” and “client” really do have to be banished now. The intervention moves to a loge in the deserted theater or a bench in the garden. Neither outside nor inside, sorrow is the medium in which the intervention is immersed, binding together participants, words, gestures. Filaments of sorrow stretch across space and time, knitting a gauzy fabric strong enough to suspend us all above the abyss.

Man of Sorrows Tour

The pursuit of happiness seems to generate a lot of depression. Maybe some of it is a cultural artifact: expectations of extreme happiness do tend to generate an emotional backlash. Or, the kinds of happiness the marketplace makes available also produce unhappiness that keeps the market stoked with ever more demand. Therapeutic interventions take all unhappiness seriously, and they try to make it go away. One of the things we all agree on: unhappiness is not something we desire.

Or is it? I’m kind of fascinated by the traditional Roman Catholic praxis of the Stations of the Cross, a simulacrum of Christ’s Via Dolorosa. The sequence of events of Christ’s death are captured in fourteen standardized pictorial images affixed, in two rows of seven, to the walls on either side of the sanctuary. The faithful “walk the stations,” stopping at each station, saying a prayer, contemplating the sorrow of Christ and his followers. It’s a meditative discipline of Catholic mysticism, a way of joining Christ vicariously in his sufferings. Through this ritualized mortification of self you can reduce your stay in the eternal waiting room called Purgatory and speed your trip to Paradise.

In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, the novel on which Blade Runner is based, Philip Dick explores a future in which Mercerism has become a popular religious praxis. This is another Dick book that seems to have disappeared from my shelves, so I can’t reference Mercer directly. Here’s the Wikipedia description:

Mercerism is a prominent religious/philosophical movement on Earth. The movement is based on the fable of Wilbur Mercer, a man who lived before the war. Adherents of Mercerism grip the handles of an electrically powered empathy box, while viewing a monitor which displays patterns that are meaningless until the handles are gripped. After a short interval the user’s senses are transported to the world of Wilbur Mercer, where they inhabit his mind in an experience shared with any other people using an empathy box at that moment.

Mercerism blends the concept of a life-death-rebirth deity with the values of unity and empathy. According to legend, Mercer had the power to revive dead animals, but local officials used radioactive cobalt to nullify the part of his brain where the ability originated. This forced Mercer into the “tomb world.” He strives to reverse the decay of the tomb world and ascend back to Earth by climbing an enormous hill. His adversaries throw rocks at him along the way (inflicting actual physical injuries on the adherents “fused” with Mercer), until he reaches the top, when the cycle starts again.

Mercerism is a collective high-tech delirium premised on the Stations of the Cross juxtaposed with the futile myth of Sisyphus. Why would future humans be drawn to this sort of thing? In part it’s because, in a society populated by increasingly humanoid robots, the capacity to feel empathic sorrow remains one of the only reliably distinguishing features of authentic humanity.

To delve into sorrow, even one’s personal sorrow, even someone else’s sorrow, even a projected simulation of sorrow, is to be gripped in the human embrace. There’s something horrible in the human condition, something grotesquely melancholy about the whole affair. We’re compulsively attracted to life, walking endlessly down the corridors of catatonia lik3 tourists in a ruin. (I just wond3r3d: could I l3arn to typ3 lik3 this as smoothly as I type like this?)

I once tried to tell a friend about a kind of practice I was considering, one that would encourage people to pursue difference for its own sake, or for the sake of an open universe. Doing this, I said, might not make the client any happier — in fact, it make the client even more unhappy. My friend was puzzled: why would anyone want to go for therapy that makes them unhappy? I conceded his point — but why does this idea keep coming back to me?

You are escorted into a sorrow that slides down the walls of the corridors. There may not even be any way to dig underneath it to the source, because the sorrow permeates and seals every surface. You bump into other people who seem to be part of the ride you’re on. There’s a gradual, nearly imperceptible incline, and when you get to the top you’re propelled down the slide right back to the tomb world. What if you keep doing this, over and over again? Would you change, or would it change? Would you be able to tell the difference?

So I’m picturing this ride, this Via Dolorosa. There are cinematic and literary source materials to draw on. The Stabat Mater would be playing on the sound system, at least long enough to set the mood. But it’s not a preprogrammed affair; each ride is different — that shouldn’t be hard to manage, because anywhere you set your foot down can be your first step up the hill. Maybe you’re bringing along a film crew, or a sketch pad, or a saxophone. You don’t know how many stations you’re going to stop at, or whether you’ll even recognize them when you come to them. Everything is on a slight incline, but it’s a featureless plateau, like driving west through Nebraska. The landscape might be richly inscribed with distinguishing features and trails, but you have to get out and walk in order to see them. Maybe they don’t even materialize until you get out and walk. It’s an Escher climb through a labyrinth without walls.

Let me be clear: I’m proposing this as a kind of therapeutic intervention, a psychological installation or interactive performance or theme park attraction. It’s a personal and idiosyncratic exploration of a universal sorrow. Maybe it’s an event from the past, maybe something even before memory. Maybe it’s everyday life as a constant sorrow. Maybe it’s a future tragedy, or an imagined one. I’m the tour guide; each session is a station; the stations count forward from one to some undetermined but fated last number. It’s aesthetic, politic, Catholic.

The line forms over to the right.

Ten Pages of Carl Rogers

Anne is reading Client-Centered Therapy by Carl Rogers (1951). Here are a couple bits she told me about that surprised me.

Rogers asked Miss Cam, one of his clients, to document her experience in therapy. After her fourth session she reported that she was finding it increasingly difficult to reflect on the therapeutic process:

” My energies are pretty well tied up in whatever process is going on, and it takes a tremendous effort to observe and record the proces: my instinct or impulse, or what have you, is all against analyzing and self-regarding — I’m much inclined to leave myself alone and just enjoy the results, or let them wash over me when I don’t enjoy them: some way or other, the whole counseling process seems to militate against any sort of introspection or preoccupation with self.”

Rogers makes this observation about his client’s reflections:

The client is, in the therapeutic hour, focusing all her attention upon self, to a degree that she has probably never known before. Yet this situation is experienced as a process which leads away from preoccupation with self. The question is worth raising as to whether therapy is not an experiencing of self, not an experience about self.

This speaks to a concern I expressed in my last post, that encouraging someone to talk about herself might just feed the addiction, encourage the obsession with oneself. Self-absorption is a way of reifying the ego as an object with a particular personality, status, self-image, history, resume of accomplishments, set of problems, plans for the future, etc. But maybe, if somebody is ready to listen to you regardless of your self-proclaimed right to be heard, you can get past all that.

During the fourth session Miss Cam experienced Rogers as “present” to her, indispensible to her happiness, someone with whom she entered into “a communion, a mutuality.” The next session didn’t go as well, and her reactions to Rogers were completely different:

“So flat and hopeless, like being up against a flat blank wall — immovable, impenetrable, unscalable, a dead end to life and growth, a sterile, uncaring wall of mystery cutting me off from myself… You might just as well not be there for all the good you can do… But you see, last time your face suddenly looked different — as if it had been black with coal dust, and then was washed clean to reveal an altogether unexpected freshness and individuality… And there’s something awfully wrong and confusing about the way you look to me now. I keep wanting to rub my eyes, as if I were brushing away cobwebs. And I’d like to wash your face. I can see it with black coal dust, and it’s a little relief to imagine taking lots of soap and water and a nice rough cloth and washing it shiny clean.”

Now Rogers consciously presents himself as pleasantly engaged and supportive in these sessions, without revealing much about himself. Miss Cam’s description of him during this fifth session illustrates, says Rogers, the strenuous process of alteration of self… a basic and extensive reorganization of self. Rogers says that clients often perceive others, including the therapist, in the same way that they perceive themselves. He regards this alternation in Miss Cam’s perceptions of him as pure projection. But isn’t it possible that Rogers is always unconsciously projecting himself as both personas, as the supportive, reflective guide in the voyage of self-discovery, and the unresponsive, indifferent blank wall? The client attunes to one virtual Carl Rogers on visit four, and the other one on visit five.

Miss Cam continued reflecting on her fifth session later in the day, which took the form of a visual image of Rogers’ face:

“As I looked at your face, it was as if a hand reached out and quite literally peeled a heavy shadow away from it, revealing the fresh, individual face which I was so disappointed to lose this afternoon. It was the most extraordinarily vivid experience, it wouldn’t be at all adequate to say it was like a hallucination — it was a hallucination. Not the face, that is, that was just a vivid memory, but the shadow of my own feelings, which I had projected on it… And that explains the haunting, but elusive sense I’ve had of something odd and baffling in your appearance, so that I’ve been torn between nervous reluctance to look at you, and a desire to stare and stare in hopes of dispelling the enigma. Then there were two or three times when I would have sworn you laughed, but when I looked you were perfectly sober, and you quite obviously hadn’t and couldn’t have been even smiling. And on one of those occasions when I looked at you, something seemed to move rapidly from your face towards my left hand and disappear.”

Rogers said he was surprised that Miss Cam found this fifth session to have been so intense, and so different from the prior one. Though he regarded Miss Cam’s hallucinations as unusual, he wasn’t particularly disturbed by them.

In general, in clients undergoing drastic self-reorganization, behaviors which would be labeled as ‘psychotic’ from a diagnostic frame of reference are encountered with some frequency. When one sees these behaviors from the internal frame of reference their functional meaning appears so clear that it becomes incomprehensible that they should be regarded as symptoms of a ‘disease.’ To regard all behavior as the meaningful attempt of the organism to adjust to itself and to its environment — this appears more fruitful for understanding personality processes than to try to categorize some behaviors as abnormal, or as constituting disease entities.

Here Rogers’ observations remind me both of Lacan and of Deleuze & Guattari. Lacan reinterprets symptoms as expressions of the unconscious trying to make itself heard and accepted by the Big Other, who is represented by the therapist. And Deleuze & Guattari speak of this radical restructuring of the self as “schizoanalysis,” a kind of controlled psychotic process. The self becomes “deterritorialized,” stripped of its usual ways of understanding itself, temporarily blurring the boundaries between inside and outside, between self and other. It’s only by undergoing this schizoid experience that the self is able to “reterritorialize” itself in some less repressive way.

I’ve been thinking about Rogers as kind of a square. Maybe I’m wrong.

Nothing Really

The client comes into the office. She’s here to talk, and you’re here to listen. You’re sure she talks all the time, to everyone she knows, but it’s never enough. Sure they listen, but they don’t really listen, not really listen. They listen for awhile, and then they talk about themselves. They listen for a minute, then they change the channel, change the topic, you know? Yes, you know.

I have this friend, she lives up in Winchester, she spends every cent on clothes. She wants to spend the summer in Australia, I don’t know, she doesn’t know anybody in Australia, and do I want to go with her? Well sure I’d love to go, I’ve never been to Australia, but two weeks? I mean, what would we do? The beach, the shops, the bars. Alicia took a trip to Australia, she positively loved it. But she went with her boyfriend, so what do you expect? They broke up as soon as they got back, just as soon as they got back. She showed me the pictures. I want to see some places, but I don’t know, Australia? I don’t have anything to wear, and that’s bullshit because I don’t care. But this friend, she’s a maniac about clothes, you know she’ll have everything and I’ll have nothing. She’s not all that cute you know, kind of a big nose, kind of a strange little thing on the side of her face, I don’t know. I like her a lot, but two weeks? We went to the auto show together once, which was ridiculous, but we had kind of a fun time. Mustang. She was talking about getting a Mustang. I don’t remember.

She writes her check, smiles, walks out the door. Why does she come here? She could talk to the Mustang, she could talk to the Australian. She could sit here in an empty room and talk and talk and no one would complain. There is absolutely nothing you can say.

There are fat people who want to be thin, depressed people who want to be happy. They are fat because they want to be thin, depressed because they want to be happy. Or because they want to be fat, want to be depressed.

Well Tom Waits he don’t wanna grow up. He don’t wanna put no money down, don’t wanna get him a big old loan, work them fingers to the bone, fall in love and get married then boom! how the hell did it get here so soon?

If there was revolution would anyone come talk to you about it? Would they wonder out loud about the dangers of taking sides? Would they talk like they were under interrogation, as if they’d been tortured then isolated for three weeks and now they’re shown into your office and they’re ready to talk want to talk? Would they talk in code like gnostics hoping you could interpret and not tell the authorities? Would they try to guess which side you were really on? If the revolution itself came in the door and wanted to talk, would you be able to keep your mouth shut?

When you write it down like that, somebody’s always coming in the room to look at it and you put it away quickly but smoothly, slip it into the bottom drawer like you’re not really hiding anything but just done with some ordinary activity and now you look up expectantly ready for whatever it is they want to say. They want to look at it, that’s why you have it there, so they’ll want to see. It’s just something you write when there’s nobody there. It’s your suicide note, it’s your confession, it’s your last words, it’s nothing really.

There will be no revolution, at least not one you’d be able to recognize. If it’s talking to you now it’s not saying anything.

The Unconscious that Surrounds Us

Two posts ago we looked at Donnel Stern’s contention that “all thought is unconscious thought.” Stern characterizes the unconscious as an unstructured array of ideas, memories, sensations, imaginings, and patterns that organize themselves into structured ideas and words in the instant that we think and speak them. But do all our thoughts come up from underneath, from inside our heads? What about the thoughts that surround us, the vast array of ideas, patterns, events, images and artifacts in which we are immersed? The unconscious isn’t just inside our heads; our heads are inside the unconscious.

In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze & Guattari describe the source of creation as a congeries of unstructured but active desires. Desires are inside us, operating as instincts and drives, but desires are also outside us, imposing structure on us through societal constraints. In contrast, the unconscious of Freud is populated only by the repressed desires, driven below the threshold of consciousness by nurture and conscience, where they fester as neurotic symptoms. Are these unconscious desires intrinsically corrupt, or have they been driven underground by the despotic desires of a corrupting culture?

It is said that the unconscious is dark and somber. Reich and Marcuse are often reproached for their “Rousseauism,” their naturalism: a conception of the unconscious that is thought to be too idyllic. But doesn’t one lend to the unconscious horrors that could only be those of consciousness, and of a belief too sure of itself? Would it be an exaggeration to say that in the unconscious there is necessarily less cruelty and terror, and of a different type, than in the consciousness of an heir, a soldier, a Chief of State? It is not the slumber of reason that engenders monsters, but vigilant and insomniac rationality. The unconscious is Rousseauistic, being man-nature. And how much malice and ruse there are in Rousseau! Trangression, guilt, castration: are these determinations of the unconscious, or is this the way a priest sees things?

For D&G the unconscious is productive. Desires emerge from the unconscious in ways that can be fulfilled, and that create rather than dissipate in their fulfillment. Lacan and Freud, following Hegel, characterizes desire as lack. D&G regard lack not as intrinsic to desire, but as imposed from outside by culture.

From the moment lack is introduced into desire, all of desiring-production is crushed, reduced to being no more than the production of fantasy… From the moment desire is welded again to the law — we needn’t point out what is known since time began, that there is no desire without law — the eternal operation of eternal repression recommences… but the sign of desire is never a sign of the law, it is a sign of strength… From the moment desire is made to depend on the signifier, it is put back under the yoke of despotism whose effect is castration, there where one recognizes the stroke of the signifier itself; but the sign of desire is never signifying, it exists in the thousands of break-flows that never allow themselves to be signified within the unary stroke of castration.

D&G’s schizoanalytic project entails disconnecting desire from law and from the symbolic order, letting it find its own way with out being castrated by the social order. They don’t necessarily regard all desires as joy-producing machines, but desires do produce something, and that something is incipiently revolutionary. At the same time, D&G don’t deny the inextricable link between desire and law. The idea is that desires carve laws into the culture as another creative act, a la Nietzsche — and desires can also destroy laws and replace them periodically. In regarding desire as real rather than symbolic, generative rather than expressive, Wilhelm Reich is recruited by D&G as an ally.

The strength of Reich consists in having shown how psychic repression depended on social repression… The family is indeed the delegated agent of this psychic repression, insofar as it ensures [quoting Reich] ‘a mass psychological reproduction of the economic system of a society.’ Of course it should not be concluded from this that desire is Oedipal. On the contrary, it is the social repression of desire or sexual repression — that is, the stasis of libidinal energy — that actualizes Oedipus and engages desire in this requisite impasse, organized by the repressive society.

Tyrannical culture territorializes desire, forcing it into subjection to despotic laws and into production of economic commodities. In a prior post we saw how Nietzsche traced the mythic origins of the societal punitive repression apparatus to an economic calculus of cruelty. A creditor finds compensation in the pleasure of inflicting pain and humiliation on the defaulting debtor. For a credit-based economy to operate what’s required is memory: the debtor has to remember that he owes, that he has made a promise to repay his debt. To create memory where there previously had been none, severe measures were required. And so it is, say D&G, that governmental power is and always has been exercised in service of the economically powerful. This power pushes its way down to the lowest social units, the family, where the father wields this cruel punitive power over the subjected children, creating a social construct that promotes fantasies of Oedipus, patricide, castration anxiety. Say D&G:

Cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence that might be commissioned to explain the history of mankind: cruelty is the movement of culture that is realised in bodies and inscribed on them, belabouring them. That is what cruelty means. The culture is not the movement of ideology; on the contrary it forcibly inserts desire into social production and reproduction. For even death, punishment and torture are desired, and are instances of production (compare the history of fatalism). It makes men or their organs into the parts and wheels of the social machine.

Is the economy a collective manifestation of cruel desire, immanent in human nature, the driving force behind creation-as-production, always the main organizing principle of human society? Certainly capital has been the dominant territorializing force for a very long time. D&G subsume Oedipus and castration and lack under this economic calculus of cruelty. This would place Lacan and Freud and Hegel and the entire psychopathology of lack inside the capitalist structure of society rather than innately inside the individual human psyche. Structures that serve capital constitute one among many possible manifestations of cruel desire directed by will. Nietzsche singles out the cruelty of parents inflicting punishment on their children just for the fun of it: this could be an artifact of capital territorialization, but you get the sense from Nietzsche that the opportunity to torture the weak is hard to pass up, that economic discipline is a post hoc justification for the sheer joy of cruelty.

Why do D&G use the term “production” rather than “creation” as that which is freed through territorialization? Are they saying that it’s always the economic nightmare that’s loosed on the world? Or are they saying that production is a primal operation of desires inscribing themselves on the world, and that the economic structures have co-opted them? I’m not sure. Similarly they use the term “engine” for something that produces, even though they use the term “organ” interchangeably with it. Why this particular vocabulary? Is desiring creation the same force as economic production?

Could it be that the identity in nature is at its highest point in the order of modern capitalist representation, because the identity is univerally realised in the immanence of this order and in the fluxion of the decoded flows? But also that the difference in régime is greatest in the capitalist order of representation, and that this representation subjects desire to an operation of social repression-psychic repression that is stronger than any other, because, by means of the immanence and the decoding, antiproduction has spread throughout all of productio, instead of remaining localised in the system, and has freed a fantastic death instinct that now permeates and crushes desire? And what is this death that always rises from without – and that, in the case of capitalism, rises with all the more power as one still fails to see exactly what this outside is that will cause it to arrive? In short, the general theory of society is the generalised theory of flows; it is in terms of the latter that one must consdier the relationship of social production to desiring-production, the variations of this relationship in each case, and the limits of this relationship in the capitalist system… there is no social formation that does not foresee, or experience a foreboding of, the real form in which the limit [capitalism] threatens to arrive, and which it wards off with all the strength at its command. Whence the obstancy with which the formations preceeding capitalism encaste the merchant and the technician, preventing flows of money and flows of productoon from assuming an autonomy that would destroy their codes. Such is the real limit.

As I read Deleuze & Guattari, capital is latent in production, and it might even be inevitable, but capital doesn’t exhaust production or limit its other virtual manifestations. A piece of experimental science can, through the application of capitalist know-how, be turned into a technological breakthrough that’s mass produced, mass distributed, and presented to consumers as a must-have. But latent in that same piece of science might be the seeds for another bit of scientific breakthrough. Both virtual futures can become actualized simultaneously. Desires can become transformed into the pursuit of happiness and mimesis and lack by capital, but those same desires can also aim toward creation and destruction and fulfillment.

D&G propose a universe of countless molecular self-propelling desires careening around looking for surfaces to inscribe — canvases, selves, physical landscapes, stone tablets, societies. It gives D&G a philosophically satisfying bottom-up assembly line for complexity and difference, but it feels impersonal and inhuman in scope. Humans are the only species to care about such things, and humans are intrinsically, latently, virtually (and perhaps lamentably) social. We desire the desire of the other, says Hegel, and he’s right — but not just in the distorted desire for plenitude-of-self that ends in lack and submission to the ultimate Master. Even infants learn only by taking the other’s perspective on the world, and the other can teach only by taking the infant’s perspective. Most human desires are directed toward the other and can be reciprocated and fulfilled most effectively not in the subpersonal or egoistic registers but interpersonally. Even desires aimed into the world presume some fulfillment in the other: a scientific breakthrough that desires to be understood, a wine that desires to be savored.

D&G reference Reich’s dream and support it:

The product of analysis should be a free and joyous person, a carrier of the life flows, capable of carrying them all the way into the desert and decoding them… Shit on your whole mortifying, imaginary, and symbolic theater. What does schizoanalysis ask? Nothing more than a bit of a relation to the outside, a little reality.

But even by getting the ego to step aside you end up with a very individualistic, self-gratifying procedure. Late capitalism works as a collective desire-management system by constructing a mutually reinforcing desire-fulfillment circuitry among individual pleasure-seeking nodes that fuel the machine by their life flows. So what if there’s some capitalist taking a little excess jouissance out of the system as a fee for keeping the machinery running? This drain off the system keeps the economy of lack functioning. Besides, there’s always more desire to be coaxed out of the engine.

D&G write with a surreal-schizoid style that fits the material. And they do finish the story with a happy futuristic ending populated by liberated creatives. Instead of a post-apocalyptic dystopia they offer an apocalypse that ushers in a utopia of ever-unfolding differance. I’d love to live in that future full of creative revolutionaries continually re-creating the world, as long a few of these heroes actually find a measure of fulfillment through my own creations.

Who’s Hot?

Who’s the hottest postmodern philosopher in the blogosphere: Zizek, Deleuze, or Lacan? The envelope please…

Thanks to Odile for the IceRocket link. Any other hot topics of interest? Enter them in “blog trend tool” on the site, then put up the 2-month posts-per-day totals in a comment.

Out of Competition

The sixtieth annual Cannes Film Festival begins today. Here’s my memoir of the fifty-seventh Festival…

Years ago Carla had been a make-up artist in Hollywood; her husband Mateo is a cinematographer. They met on a shoot – apparently the lead actor showed up for work in a drugged stupor half the time, giving the crew a lot of time to get to know each other. A production assistant of that long-forgotten movie had single-handedly withstood the onslaught of utter chaos, an accomplishment that led to his subsequent rise in the industry. Now, fifteen years later, he was a major producer with a film in competition at Cannes. He was gay, and he needed an escort for the red-carpet walk and the fabulous party his studio would be throwing. Carla was an hour’s flight away, in Florence.

I sometimes wonder why I’ve never found myself attracted to Carla. She looks great, and she flirts flagrantly. According to her testimony, the most unlikely of mutual friends has grabbed her ass repeatedly, and I don’t doubt it. It is, I have frequently had occasion to observe, a rather bony ass – I presume she has an eating disorder. Not that I have anything against skinny women. I could imagine her biting my dick off then laughing maniacally as she spit it out onto the floor, one scrawny bangled forearm smearing the blood down her chin. Even in our historically arms-length friendship Carla had established an intermittent yet persistent pattern of volatility. She would react with verbal violence to perceived slights, and she seemed to enjoy provoking people, even strangers. Even me. Toward Mateo she was nearly always caustic; when they were together he usually looked like he had a headache just above his right eye. I assumed that he probably had a fling now and then, and that the extensive travel schedule wasn’t least among the many things that Mateo liked about his work. Still, I couldn’t see him leaving her. I felt fairly sure that if they ever separated it would be Carla’s doing.

The last time we’d seen Carla she’d seemed exultant. Careening through the narrow roads in her little European car, jabbering animatedly into the cell phone she held in one hand while with the other making obscene gestures out the window at the drivers she cut off, Carla seemed hell-bent on out-Italianing the Italians. Some mutual friends had stopped by to see us after a few days in Florence, and they seemed vaguely worried about Carla. Did it seem to us that maybe Carla took a little too much wine with lunch and dinner? I hadn’t noticed anything. Besides, it’s Europe, for God’s sake – you eat, you talk, you drink. I had sent her a hunk of my first novel. “It’s brilliant, of course,” she had told me over the phone. I wondered if she still held this exalted opinion of my stuff once I’d told her what the friend-of-a-friend New York agent said about the first five chapters. In my courteous reply to that pompous bastard I’d observed that, since I rarely read books written in the last forty years, I wasn’t quite sure what he meant by “experimental fiction,” but I figured that unmarketability must be the definitive symptom of the disease.

Anne and I got together for lunch with Carla and her producer friend down on the zone pietonne. The day felt familiar: meandering crowds of people watching each other, an enjoyable and leisurely meal of uninspired cooking, a drunken young Frenchman yelling at us in passable English – “I am a Jewish man, I love America, I have four beers.” The producer seemed amiable if not particularly communicative – “oh wow” was his usual observation about anything anyone had to say. By contrast Carla’s effusiveness seemed positively manic. She wasn’t quite satisfied with the ensemble she’d brought for the Saturday night following the producer’s premiere, when they would dine with exclusive company aboard the world’s largest yacht. We paid a visit to our friend at the Chanel shop, but I don’t think Carla could focus her attention long enough to look around, let alone buy. She and the vendeuse were obviously sizing each other up. Both are beautiful women, but in very different ways: one muted and subtle and languid, a figure in a Monet; the other sharply edged in black hair, porcelain skin, blood-red lips.

The plan was this: Saturday afternoon, before the screening, Anne, Kenzie and I would show up at the door of the exclusive beachfront hotel on Cap d’Antibes where Carla was staying — the very hotel where, not at all coincidentally, the Fitzgeralds and their entourage created the Riviera, or at least the version of the Riviera that captivated the imaginations of two or three generations of Americans. Of course we weren’t on The List, so Carla would have to meet us at the front gate. Then we would have lunch and hang around the hotel together, gawking at the stars and listening to Carla gossip about the first two days of the festival.

We would have proven a grave disappointment to Fitzgerald fans. We had no wardrobe. We had no car – our flat was right downtown so we didn’t often need one; and besides, parking cost a fortune in that densely-packed strip of urban space squeezed between the Mediterranean and the Alps. Also we had no money. Or, more accurately, every day we had less of it, with fewer prospects for replenishing the dwindling supply. It’s hard to remember sometimes, but at the time we regarded our small European life as a kind of deliverance. We would not be arriving in style at the grand Riviera hotel, springing from the limousine, lavishly tipping the bellmen who opened all the doors just for us. No, it would be the train for us that Saturday. Now I love trains; to me Europe means trains. Humphrey Bogart smokes in the cold rain at a Paris station, waiting for a woman – this, not Scott and Zelda at the beach tossing back too many highballs, was the Europe of my imagination. Only that day I wasn’t heading for Paris or Barcelona, the kind of passage where even people like me, with boring clothes and flat American accents, can regard themselves as sophisticated world travelers. Instead I was riding the local commuter run, busy weekdays shunting people to work or school or the shops in Cannes and Nice and Monaco, but a pretty desolate operation on Saturday at noon. With its grimy windows and gouged seats and spray-tagged walls, the cars looked like they’d be right at home on a southside branch of the Chicago El.

Carla was going to get her hair and nails done that Saturday morning, then she would call so we could arrange our rendezvous. We waited until eleven: no call. I figured we’d better get started anyway, so we’d be in position when the call finally came. Just before we set off to catch the train we decided to call Carla on her cell: no answer. “It’ll be fun,” I reassured myself.

The ten-minute walk to the Gare Central took us down the Rue d’Italie through the African district, its vegetable markets and patisseries and Hallal bucheries lively and boisterous, the unidentifiable aromas from the Moroccan and Reunion Island cafes infusing me with their exotic funk. We climbed the steps to the Avenue Thiers, lined with sex shops and pharmacies and Chinese fast-food joints, then crossed over to the station. At the automated ticket-dispensing machine I dialed in my destination – Juan les Pins, the stop nearest Cap d’Antibes and the last one before Cannes – and payed the fare with my French credit card. The train pulled in on time and nearly empty – there didn’t seem to be many cinéastes and glitterati riding the rails to the Festival. We chose seats facing each other, from which we caught intermittent glimpses of the sea along the short run through Cagnes-sur-Mer and Antibes to Juan Les Pins.

We called Carla from the train: no answer. We called again when we got off: no answer. Maybe our phone isn’t working? We found a pay phone just outside the station: no answer. Maybe Carla’s phone isn’t working? A shopkeeper looked up the hotel’s number for us: no answer in her room, monsieur; would you care to leave a message at the desk? Sure. We began the slow and pointless stroll through Juan Les Pins, heading generally toward the esplanade. From there we could take either a bus or a cab out to the Cap and the splendid hotel. If worse came to worst we could walk, which I figured was two kilometers from the station, tops. It was May, the weather was perfect – what better way to spend a late Saturday morning than promenading along one of the most beautiful stretches of seacoast in the world?

As it turned out, of course, we never did make it out onto the Cap. We looked in at a couple of boutiques. Anne placed another phone call from the lobby of a small hotel while Kenzie and I watched an elegant Italian family and a Texan wearing skin-tight jeans and a white cowboy hat check in. Eventually we had lunch at an outdoor place where the Cap begins jutting into the sea. I thought about walking the rest of the way, just showing up at the hotel and taking our chances, but decided against it. Instead we headed the other direction, along a walkway embedded with handprints left behind by musicians who over the years had performed at the summer jazz festival in Juan. Louis Armstrong. Django Reinhart. Miles Davis. We made three more phone calls.

Sitting on the pier we could see the cluster of yachts moored just off the end of the Cap, each one serviced by launches shuttling guests between ship and shore. Below us fish glinted sunlit reflections in the clear turquoise phosphorescence. An old man with a cigarette dangling from his lower lip held a fishing line over the side; he shared a tall can of beer with a couple of his copains. I may have dozed off. Out of nowhere a pontoon boat pulled up to the end of the pier, disgorging its cargo of American and European tourists. After a time the old pêcheur reeled one in. “Felicitations,” I called out to him, and he nodded a dignified acknowledgment. He unhooked the fish, laid it carefully in the small styrofoam cooler, and walked slowly away.

At about four thirty Carla called. Up late, took a nap, didn’t hear the phone, never got any messages. You know my cell is Italian, so you have to dial the country code first. No? Oh well, we’re leaving for the opening in forty minutes. Too bad it didn’t work out. Oops, Cameron’s at the door, she wants to borrow a dress. Ciao.

When we got home I picked up a pizza from the guy who bakes them in a van permanently parked on the street about a block from our place. There’s a hole punched in the roof of the van with a chimney sticking out of it, for venting the oven.

We never heard what Cannes was like. No, I take that back. We heard about Mick Jagger ordering a full English breakfast in the hotel restaurant. We heard about some blasted studio executive singing like a crazy man out on the yacht. Mateo told Carla she ought to write about the festival on her blog. She said it was a good idea, but she never did it. As a matter of fact, I don’t think she ever made another posting to that blog after Cannes.

All Thought Is Unconscious

Awhile back Ron Wright recommended Unformulated Experience (2003) by Donnel Stern as a psychoanalyst who engages postmodern hermeneutical theory. In the first section of the book Stern offers a reinterpretation of the unconscious, which is the subject of this post.

In traditional psychoanalytic theory, the unconscious is a reservoir of past meaningful experience. The unconscious is already structured in the mind — it might even be structured like a language, as Lacan claims. We can in fact represent the unconscious content in language — if we would allow it. But we’ve erected barriers between the unconscious and consciousness, protecting us from thoughts and memories we’d rather not acknowledge. However, the unconscious is always shaping our desires, feelings and behaviors — it’s the true source of our motivations even if we don’t realize it. The work of traditional psychoanalysis is to “tame” the unconscious by bringing it into conscious awareness, where it can be incorporated into the controlling ego. In Lacanian analysis the work is to allow the unconscious to be recognized as a part of the self by giving it voice in verbal language.

Stern contends that the unconscious is not prestructured. Thoughts and memories are scattered across the neural network in a loose and fluid matrix. The process of bringing this material into consciousness is specifically to impose structure and meaning on it. Because this is so, the same unconscious materials can be consciously assembled in a variety of different ways and assigned different meanings. It’s not that this experience was once structured in a particular way and that the structure has been erased by the unconscious. Rather, the unconscious is the realm of “unformulated experience.”

Well-formed cognitions do not exist in or behind the unformulated states that precede them. Rather, the well-formed version remains to be shaped. The unformulated is not yet knowable in the separate and definable terms of language. Unformulated material is composed of vague tendencies; if allowed to develop to the point at which they can be shaped and articulated, these become the more lucid kind of reflective experience we associate with mutually comprehended verbal articulations.

The unconscious isn’t empty. It’s not that consciousness can make up any old thing. The unconscious isn’t empty; it is the content that must be shaped and explicated. In the unconscious are recollections, images, behavior sequences, ideas, impressions, feelings, imaginings, and so on. But the content swirls around in an inchoate state, adaptable to any number of virtual meanings that can pull them together into a coherent pattern.

If we are asked exactly what is unformulated in unformulated experience, then, we can say that it is meaning. When we accomplish a new formulation, we have created a new meaning. Sometimes a new meaning entails new perceptions, memories, fantasies, and so on; sometimes it does not.

Some unconscious experiences are indeed repressed, just like Freud said. Others are never allowed to take shape meaningfully; they remain in a state of “familiar chaos.” It’s safer sometimes to remain stupid rather than face the consequences of letting ourselves understand something that’s unsettling or potentially devastating. The refusal to formulate is quite simple; one just restricts one’s freedom of thought, and the “offending” experience is never created. We remain embedded in the familiar, not willing to allow our curiosity to rock the boat.

Another kind of unformulated experience is what Stern calls “creative disorder.” Imagine you’re an American visiting a foreign country and you want to know what your new friend thinks about George Bush. You know a little of the language, but you’re far from fluent. You think about what you want to ask, you construct a simple sentence in English, then you substitute the foreign words for the English ones. Now you’re ready to ask (but probably totally incapable of understanding the answer if it involves anything more than head-shaking). This sort of sentence construction is explicitly not based on creative disorder. In America you don’t have to go through all these contortions. As soon as the possibility of asking the question comes to mind you have the words to express it. The question becomes the entree to a potentially free-ranging conversation in which both parties draw on their memory, beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge, in which each person’s response opens up a whole new horizon of available topics and interpretations. The ideas coalesce in the act of thinking; the words align themselves in the speaking.

We have no choice but to wait for what the following moment will reveal. Quite literally, we do not know what we will think next. Thoughts, images, and feelings come to us; they arrive; one feels like a conduit. We are used to the notion that ideas simply arrive in the mind of the genius. The madman, too. But the idea that everyone thinks this way is less familiar… The “unconscious thought” revealed in artistic inspiration and creative dreams is not as unusual or mysterious as it seems. These events are best understood as particularly graphic and dramatic instances of a process that occurs with regularity, and in waking hours as often as in sleep. All thought, in this sense, is unconscious thought.

Stern quotes French essayist an poet Paul Valery on the way in which newly-created ideas and phrases emerge from the vaguely virtual realm of the unconscious:

The instability, incoherence, inconsequence of which I spoke which trouble and limit the mind in any sustained effort of construction or composition, are just as surely also treasures of possibility, whose riches it senses in its vicinity at the very moment when it is consulting itself. These are the mind’s reserves, from which anything may come, its reasons for hoping that the solution, the signal, the image, or the missing word may be nearer at hand than it seems. The mind can always feel in the darkness around it the truth or the decision it is looking for, which it knows to be at the mercy of the slightest thing, of that very meaningless disorder which seemed to divert it and banish it indefinitely… Disorder is the condition of the mind’s fertility: it contains the mind’s promise, since its fertility depends on the unexpected rather than the expected, on what we do not know, and because we do not know it, than on what we know.

Psychotherapy as Modern Artifact

People have interpersonal desires for affection, sex, learning, communication, recognition, affiliation. These desires aim outward, seeking fulfillment in other people. People also have affordances for satisfying others’ desires. In interactions we spend a lot of time navigating the force fields of desire and affordance, moving forward slightly if there seems to be reciprocity, backing off if we sense resistance. We look for mutual attunement: by tentatively expressing our desires we seem to activate the virtual fulfillment we detect in others’ affordances, while at the same time their desires seem to detect and to elicit our affordances. Through small cycles of reciprocal desire and fulfillment we gradually we move closer together, setting aside the barriers we ordinarily maintain to protect ourselves.

In a therapeutic relationship the therapist responds positively to the client’s desire to be accepted, acknowledged, understood. The therapist is interested in the client, curious, involved, seeking to see things from the client’s perspective. The client gradually lowers his barriers, becomes more open and honest, receptive to the therapist. All this seems perfectly natural. Why, then, is it necessary to speak of transference? Why should the therapist assume that the client is recreating past relationships when he seeks to fulfill his desires through the therapist? The cues of reciprocal attunement are in play; this is a forward movement toward closer intimacy at least as much as it is a backward plunge into the past.

But the therapist is committed to the rule of abstinence, not succumbing to the client’s desire for love, or even to the therapist’s own desire reveal himself reciprocally in the evolving relationship. Faced with the therapist’s anomalous juxtaposition of receptivity and remoteness, he client becomes confused, frustrated, angry, resistant. The blocked flow of the client’s desire and his efforts to overcome the frustration becomes the main focus of analysis, revealing ways in which the client relates to the therapist in ways that repeat the client’s frustrated relationships with others in the past. In The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis (1967), Ralph Greenson writes:

The task is to get the reasonable ego of the patient to realize that his transference feelings are unrealistic, are based on a fantasy, and have some ulterior motive. Then the patient will be more willing to work on his feelings, to try to explore them with the aim of tracing them back to his past life.

The therapeutic relationship plays itself out simultaneously in two registers: the transference and the working alliance. Greenson again:

The working alliance is the relatively nonneurotic, rational relationship between patient and analyst which makes it possible for the patient to work purposefully in the analytic relationship… The clinical manifestations of this working alliance are the patient’s willingness to carry out the various procedures of psychoanalysis and his ability to work analytically with the regressive and painful insights which arise. The alliance is formed between the patient’s reasonable ego and the analyst’s analyzing ego. The significant occurrence is a partial and temporary identification that the patient makes with the analyst’s attitude and method of work which the patient experiences firsthand in the regular analytic sessions… The patient’s ability to form a relatively rational, desexualized, and de-aggressified relationship to the analyst stems from his capacity to have formed such neutralized relationships in his past life. The analyst contributes to the working alliance by his consistent emphasis on understanding and insight, by his continual analysis of the resistances, and by his compassionate, empathic, straightforward, and nonjudgmental attitudes… The analyst’s way of working, his therapeutic style, and the analytic setting produce an “analytic atmosphere,” which is an important means of inducing the patient to accept on trial something hitherto repelled. This atmosphere promotes the working alliance and entices the patient temporarily and partially to identify with the analyst’s analytic point of view.

You could say that the therapeutic relationship too is predicated on reciprocal transference and countertransference. The therapist projects onto the client a persona compiled from prior training and experience and professional intent; the client, also based on prior experience, responds by identifying himself with the therapist’s professional persona. Both therapist and client enter into the analytic atmosphere, a particular kind of interpersonal environment in which the client is induced to act in ways he would ordinarily find repulsive.The client plays a double role with the therapist. In the working relationship the client’s “reasonable ego” aligns himself with the therapist’s “analyzing ego,” oriented toward accomplishing the work of analysis. In the transference relationship the analyst’s analyzing ego aligns himself with the client’s neurotically regressive experiencing ego in working through the transference. For therapy to progress the client must oscillate between the working relationship and the neurotic transference, between the reasonable ego and the neurotic ego. The therapist, on the other hand, sustains the analyzing ego even during the client’s regressive, neurotic transference. Says Greenson: The relative anonymity of the analyst, his nonintrusiveness, the so-called “rule of abstinence,” and the “mirrorlike” behavior of the analyst all have the effect of preserving a relatively uncontaminated field for the budding transference neurosis. In other words, the therapist tries to present the client with a neutral but observing presence, ensuring that the transference flows exclusively from client to therapist without being triggered or shaped by the analyst’s behavior or affect. All the while, of course, the analytic atmosphere is embedded in a primal interpersonal environment continually traversed by unconscious flows of desire and affordance, continually converging and diverging in a limitless flux of virtual realities.

A third relationship exists between client and therapist: the “real” relationship. The transference relationship, while genuine, is neither realistic nor appropriate, being predicated on a repetition of the client’s prior experiences in other relationships. The working alliance is both realistic and appropriate, but it’s an artifact of the professional nature of the transaction and the analytic atmosphere established by the therapist. But there is always a real relationship that exists virtually between therapist and client, a mutual recognition that they are human beings with personalities and lives (and desires and affordances) outside (and inside) the therapy. Though the therapist attempts to present himself as a professional and a neutral transference object, his real self occasionally (always) peeks through. Similarly, the client can (will) engage the therapist not strictly as a professional or a transference object but as a real conversational partner. For the therapist to deny his “real self” to the client is to take therapeutic neutrality and abstinence into a kind of cryogenic inhumanity. Greenson again: For the analyst to work effectively and happily in the field of psychoanalysis it is important that his analytic and physicianly attitudes be derived essentially from his real relationship to the patient.

Superimposed on an interactional environment traversed by desires and affordances, the complexity of the therapeutic relationship is striking. It’s an incredibly sophisticated cultural artifact, demanding stylized and carefully nuanced choreography of both partners in the interaction. Though therapy seeks te elicit covert, regressive, irrational, chaotic, unconscious responses from the client, the relationship that facilitates these reactions is explicit, progressive, rational, disciplined, conscious. The theory is comprehensive, integrated, systematic; the praxis and the analytic atmosphere are thoroughly professsionalized, embedded in transactional exchanges of the market economy.

In short, this sort of analytic therapy is a characteristic production of high/late modernity. That isn’t an indictment; it’s merely an interpretation.

An Environment Charged with Desire

This is a further elaboration of Gibson’s theory of affordances outlined in yesterday’s post. Here I extend the ideas to the understanding of human desires.

All animals are genetically equipped with desires. These desires begin as surviving-machines — inboard motors that enhance the likelihood of the animal transmitting its genes to the next generation. An animal’s desires are “aimed” at the environment in which the animal lives, seeking fulfillment in features of the environment that afford survival and reproduction. So: an animal’s desire to eat seeks its fulfillment in things in the environment that afford nourishment. If the animal has no desire to eat it will not survive. If the animal desires to eat foods that are non-nutritious or toxic to its species, the animal will not survive. Genes that induce the animal specifically to desire nourishing foods (e.g. through visual attraction or taste pleasure) would persist in the gene pool; genes that cause the animal to desire toxic foods would not persist.

The animal’s innate desires have been shaped by features of the environment that can fulfill those desires. Perception and action are selectively drawn to these environmental affordances. Affordances are real, existing in the environment as virtual satisfiers of desire; they become actualized when an animal’s desire is drawn to them.

Many of our desires are “aimed” toward other people for their fulfillment. We look to other humans for protection, for learning about the world, for affiliation, for affection, for procreation, for communication, for learning about ourselves. These desires too have been shaped through evolution, genetically passed on to us as motivations to surive and to reproduce. Our desires are attracted to the affordances that other people possess for fulfilling our desires. Everyone else is a virtual fulfiller of our desires, actualized when our desires are drawn to them.

Because we individually are “other” to everyone else, we are also virtual fulfillers of others’ desires. We afford protection, friendship, learning opportunities, sex, conversation — virtual fulfillments of others’ desires, actualized when their desires are drawn to us.

We aren’t isolated atoms traversing the world, occasionally bouncing off or sticking to another atom. We are always immersed in the environment, an environment in which our species evolved and to which we are genetically suited, an environment full of objects and other people that afford virtual fulfillments of our desires. As we move through the environment one or more desires may become activated in us. Then we move through the environment attuned to the multiple virtual fulfillments that the environment affords. The environment becomes charged with desire. Things and people possess features that now attract our attention; they emerge from the flux as virtual fulfillments of our desire. And we are predisposed to respond to their attraction — as if the environment desires our desire.

At the same time we are always also part of the environment. We possess affordances for fulfilling others’ desires. For some our affordances remain latent and undetected, and we recede into the undifferentiated flux of the environment. For others our affordances have become evident, attracting their attention. These are the ones whose desire is activated, who as they move through the ambient environmental array are attuned to the virtual fulfillments of desire that surround them. They detect our affordances — the attractors we always emit as virtual fulfillers of others’ desire. They find themselves attracted to us.

Affordances of the Meaningful Environment

This is a variation on the theme I began in my last post on Deleuze’s virtual-actual distinction. Turns out it’s a hot topic, with recent posts here, here, and here. Before moving on to implications for the self, I want to talk a little bit about J.J. Gibson’s The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979). Gibson’s theory of environmental affordances corresponds to the virtual realities of Gilles Deleuze as I understand them.

Gibson begins his book by defining environment as the surroundings of those organisms that perceive and behave, that is to say, animals. Animals and their environments are inseparable: No animal could exist without an environment surrounding it. Before animals evolved there was an earth and an atmosphere but there was no environment. The physical world can be described in terms of space, time, matter, and energy; the environment is described relative to the animals that occupy it. Every animal is both a perceiver of the environment and a behaver in the environment. Consequently, an environment can be described in terms of its affordances for perception and behavior. Here’s an example of environmental affordances relative to the behavior of pedestrian animals:

An open environment affords locomotion in any direction over the ground, whereas a cluttered environment affords locomotion only at openings… A path affords pedestrian locomotion from one place to another, between the terrain features that prevent locomotion. The preventers of locomotion consist of obstacles, barriers, water margins, and brinks (the edges of cliffs). A path must afford footing: it must be relatively free of rigid foot-sized obstacles.

This isn’t a neutral description of physical objects; it’s description of what the environment means to the animals that occupy it.

The world of physical reality does not consist of meaningful things. The world of ecological reality does. If what we perceived were the entities of physics and mathematics, meanings would have to be imposed on them. But if what we perceive are the entities of environmental science, their meanings can be discoveredThe affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either good or ill.

So, an animal is motivated to behave: maybe it’s hungry, or it’s being pursued by a predator. The animal is currently at point A. There’s are many possible pathways leading away from point A. Perhaps one of the paths leads to point B, at which perhaps there is a raspberry patch that provides food or a protective hiding place. The path to point B affords intentional behavior that coincides with the animal’s current motivation as it is passing by point A. If there were no animals in the world, the path and the raspberry patch wouldn’t offer any behavioral affordances: they would just be two features of the physical world. There may be other times when this particular animal passes point A and is not hungry or being pursued, or other times when the animal is hungry or threatened but is nowhere near the path or the raspberry patch. The affordances of the path and the raspberry patch remain part of the environment, but they aren’t salient to the animal’s present motivation. To borrow Deleuze’s terms, the environmental affordances are always real, but they are virtual. Only when a behaving or perceiving animal directly encounters the environment’s affordances do those affordances become actual. Here’s how Gibson puts it:

The affordance of something does not change as the need of the observer changes. The observer may or may not perceive or attend to the affordance, according to his needs, but the affordance, being invariant, is always there to be perceived. An affordance is not bestowed upon an object by a need of an observer and his act of perceiving it. The object offers what it does because it is what it is.

In Gibson’s theory, perceiving isn’t the passive reception of visual or auditory stimuli but an achievement, a keeping-in-touch with the world, a continuous active experiencing rather than a having of discrete experiences, an awareness-of rather than a free-floating awareness. Affordances aren’t communicated by the environment to the perceiver; rather, the affordances are always already out there in the environment, always available to be detected by whoever has the active intent to do so.

The environment changes through the unfolding of natural events, but humans also change the environment. Why? In order to change the affordances: to make environmental benefits more accessible, to render threats less potent. How? Not by creating an artificial environment entirely separate from the natural one. Rather, humans take intentional, incremental, constructive action on the natural environment that the environment itself affords.

For humans the richest and most important environmental affordances are to be found in other humans. Unlike other features of the environment, other people interact with us: they provide us with affordances, and vice versa. That’s why even infants behave differently with other people than they do with any other objects: early in development children become attuned to the interactions afforded by other human beings. When the other person too becomes attuned, an environmental arena of joint attention is established, generating interactional affordances like nurturing, fighting, playing, learning, cooperating, communicating. What other persons afford, says Gibson, comprises the whole realm of social experience for human beings.

This is a radical hypothesis, for it implies that the “values” and “meanings” of things in the environment can be directly perceived. Moreover, it would explain the sense in which values and meanings are external to the perceiver… It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment.

Virtual and Actual Realities

When I speak I’m trying to communicate. Relationship is the joint attentional context of communication; language allows us to triangulate on a shared meaning of the communication; language points to the object of our joint attention and shared meaning. We’ve discussed how we (mis)understand what people say (and don’t say); this time the focus is on what gets said.

There is an unlimited number of possible things I could attend to in the world, and also a limitless number of possible grammatically-correct statements I could speak. By choosing to attend to something in particular and by choosing to say something in particular about it, am I thereby closing off all the other unchosen possibilities? Does a conversation work like a series of decision trees, where at each exchange another spoken phrase lops off all the other phrases that could have followed the preceding one? So that by the end of a conversation, when the joint attentional-linguistic trajectory has taken its final form, that particular conversation can be characterized as the realization of just one of an ininite number of possible conversational realities?

Or, alternatively… The world is real in an unlimited number of ways, depending on how it is attended to, by whom, with what intention, according to what framework of interpretation and meaning. Actualizing one of these virtually real worlds doesn’t eliminate all the other ways in which the world can be actualized — they’re still there, part of the real world. Likewise with language: it contains within itself an unlimited number of virtual manifestations. Pulling one sentence out of this virtual linguistic reality and making it actual doesn’t foreclose any of the other ways in which language can be actualized, by me or by anyone else.

This virtual reality-actual reality distinction is what I understand Deleuze to be talking about. So: I sit here at my computer and I look around the room. What do I see? I see that the rug I just vacuumed still has miscellaneous dirt on it, which is unfortunate because someone is coming within the hour to look at this rug with the intention of buying it. Now the rug has been sitting there for almost two years, and it achieved roughly its current state of cleanliness about an hour ago. Though the rug and its cleanliness are real features of the world, I’m not usually attentive to these features — to me the rug’s reality usually remains virtual rather than actual. In all likelihood the only people who are even remotely interested in this particular rug right now are me, my daughter (though her interest is minuscule), my wife (who has assigned me the task of cleaning the rug and showing it), and the potential buyer (who has seen a photo of the rug on the Photoshop catalog my wife put together and who even now is presumably on her way to Antibes to have a look at it). The convergence of time, place and circumstance charge the virtual reality of the rug and its cleanliness in a way that makes it more likely to come to my attention. And my recent cleaning act, my current intention of having a clean rug to show, and my future intention of exchanging this rug for some euros makes me more attuned to the virtual reality of the rug, pulling it into actual reality that includes me, the rug, the various intentions surrounding the rug, and all the other circumstances that are converging on the rug. In this actual reality the more-or-less clean rug is imbued with a kind of plenitude that makes it emerge from the inchoate flux of everything else that is real, that can be attended to, that can be spoken of.

In virtual reality a conversation isn’t a series of choices that eliminate all other possible pathways but the one that becomes real. Rather, a conversation is an evolving creation. By actualizing the first sentence from virtual linguistic space, I change the context in which the language is present. Everything is as it was before, with the addition of a single spoken sentence. My conversational partner takes this sentence into account as she contemplates the virtually infinite linguistic space. A different array of virtual sentences make themselves evident to her, sentences that might never have been considered until I spoke my first sentence. Actualizing the language this way isn’t so much a selection as a creation, because the virtual sentences don’t manifest themselves until the conversational context draws them out of the undifferentiated but dynamic linguistic flux. Even repeating the same sentence isn’t really a repetition, because now it’s being built onto a joint conversational creation that’s different from what it was the last time that particular sentence was spoken.

So, if that makes sense, next I’ll discuss the implications of Deleuze’s virtual-actual distinction when talking about the self.

Last Night in Nice

Last night we went in to Nice for dinner and a movie. Today is V-E Day, so people with regular jobs could stay out a little later last night than on working nights. We were to rendezvous at the usual place: a mediocre Italian restaurant a few blocks from the theater. Anne and I walked in from the train station a bit concerned: the trains were going on strike at 19h00 — perhaps a protest against the election of Sarkozy — and if we were to catch the last bus back to Antibes we’d have to miss the movie. The three women had arrived just ahead of us — Joel must have been delayed on his commute from Monaco. We greeted one another with les bisous, then decided to eat outdoors.

“Now that Sarkozy wins we foreigners must leave the country,” I remarked. “Not Americans,” Sonia assured us — she looked wan, more weathered than tan, as if she’d aged ten years since we saw her last. “Yes, but we are leaving,” Anne said — I had ruined the announcement. “Yes, well, it’s normal,” Sonia observed. Valerie wanted to know where in America. Back to Boulder. Ah, of course. Rozenn smiled broadly: “It’s fate. It’s your country. Me, I could not live in America. Quinze jours, that was enough. The food in America is terrible. And the wine is too strong, and expensive.”

None of the three seemed particularly curious about why we were leaving. None expressed any regret. More than once we had heard Rozenn describe her and Joel’s visit to America ten years ago. Most of the stories related one way or another to food, and not once did they have a good meal. Why had she decided to tell this story again, just now? “It’s not true,” was my only response. There are good meals to be had in America, I was thinking — far better meals, in fact, than the one we’re likely to be served here tonight. We have shared sorrows with Rozenn; at times we’ve felt like part of her family. Now it’s as if we’re new acquaintances, subjected to her drolly bourgeois French take on our native land. And the other two — divorced, emotionally and financially distressed — they too act as if this were any other dinnertime chat among acquaintances.

Joel arrived, briefcase in hand, affable as always. “They’re going back to America,” he was informed even before he sat down. No! Yes. But why? We explained briefly; Joel understood. Discussion moved on to the election results, other matters. The food was not very good; neither was the film. Afterward Joel and Rozenn drove us home. We learned that Rozenn’s 3-day-old niece died the day before, that Sonia was nearly suicidal over a tumultuous love affair with that frivolous and drunken charmer Bernard. We will have dinner again with Rozenn and Joel before we leave. Perhaps this one last time we will be joined by our 14-year-old daughters, former schoolmates who have lost touch with one another.

Last time I really did not want to leave France. This time I’m indifferent. Last time I really did not want to go back to Boulder. This time I’m indifferent. I wish there was somewhere I wanted to go.

Thinking is Not a Crime

It was during one of the violent phases of the Revolution.

– Luis Buñuel, Ensayo de un Crimen, 1955

Archibaldo de la Cruz admits it: I’m a murderer. The police inspector smiles and sends Archie on his way. I can’t prosecute you for wishing someone’s death. Thinking is not a crime, my friend. But the women really are dead.

As the story begins Archibaldo, pampered scion of the Mexican aristocracy, is angry with his mother for leaving him with the governess for the evening. To calm his tirade, Archie’s mother brings him the music box. At the mother’s prompting, the governess tells Archie a story about the music box: made by fairies for a king, the box would make its owner’s every wish come true. She goes to the window and watches the police and the rebels fighting in the street below. Archie, glaring at her, turns the key on the music box. As soon as the music starts the governess falls to the floor dead, stricken by a stray bullet fired in the skirmish below. Archibaldo is ecstatic. He stands over the body, a trickle of blood pooling on her neck, her exposed legs voluptuous in death. I assure you that morbid sensation gave me a certain pleasure, Archie recalls, to feel myself all-powerful.

A beautiful nun stands next to Archie’s hospital bed, smiling as she listens to this macabre childhood reminiscence. She tells him she didn’t like his story, but the look on her face says otherwise. It’s imprinted on my memory like a photograph, he tells her. Time has a way of distorting things, the nun replies. She leaves the room for a minute; Archie extracts from his possessions a box containing seven straight-edge razors, one for each day of the week. He extracts the Friday blade. When the nun comes back, Archie asks her: Wouldn’t you be glad to die if it means eternal bliss? She would. I’ll give you that joy, Archie says, opening the razor. Terrified, the nurse runs out of the room, down the empty corridor, and into the empty elevator shaft, plunging to her death.

Buñuel shows us the unholy trinities of the Hispanic soul: aristocracy, church and military; motherhood, sex, and sadomasochism. And now we also see the magical fulfillment of desire, a kind of answered prayer, the spirit incarnate in Catholic mystical union. But there’s still something missing, something that makes confession unsatisfying, leaving Archibaldo neither punished nor forgiven: he has been denied the pleasure of actually committing the sin in the flesh.

Two more women die before Archibaldo’s imaginary killing spree comes to an end. Archie wants to murder them, he can see himself murdering them (we see it too, the fantasies enacted on screen). And they are killed… but not by Archie.

The fifth woman he meets at an antique shop. He’s shopping for a necklace; a couple are looking at a music box. Archie recognizes the tune immediately: he takes the box out of the woman’s hands. It belonged to my mother and is very dear to me. The woman, touched, begins reminiscing. He’s not interested in your childhood recollections, the man tells her — he looks just like Freud. The shopkeeper agrees to sell the box to Archie: To me childhood memories are sacred.

After the third woman’s death Archie goes into a bar. There’s a picture of Mary on the wall — we learn that this bar used to be a monastery. Archie orders a glass of milk. A woman comes up to him, asks if he remembers her. He doesn’t. She starts whistling the music box tune — it’s the woman from the antique shop. As always, Archie is charming, smartly dressed, almost effeminately elegant in manner. She has to go — her “daddy” is waiting, the man who looks like Freud. She hands Archie her card on her way out.

He looks for her at the address on the card, which turns out to be a dress shop. The woman doesn’t work there, and no one has heard of her. But then Archie sees her — or rather, a mannequin that looks just like her. He finds out where the mannequin came from and finds her there, modeling for some art students. She compliments him on his resourcefulness in tracking her down from the boutique. I saw you there dumb and paralyzed, Archie tells her. An artist himself, Archie invites her to his house for a private session, and she agrees.

On the appointed day Archie dismisses his servants early. As he shows the woman around his exquisite home, he takes her to the sitting room to meet his “cousin.” There, seated on the couch, is the woman’ s mannequin double. She laughs. How did you get my sister to come here? She’s a good girl. My parents always said she’d turn out bad. When he goes out to pour drinks — wine for her, water for himself — he makes a quick trip to the big pottery kiln and stokes up the fire. When he returns, he finds that she has changed clothing with her double. Archie attempts to kiss her, but she resists. When he goes over to the mannequin and begins kissing her, the living woman reaches toward Archie and pulls him toward her. They kiss. As he’s about to gag her the doorbell buzzes. He’s angry, but she’s visibly amused — it turns out she’s invited some of her clients to tour Archie’s house. As he leaves, the woman tells Archie she’s getting married to the Freud lookalike; but you’ll always have my little sister.

Enraged, Archie grabs the mannequin double by the throat, then drags her by the hair. One of the legs falls off; he picks it up and tucks it under his arm. He lays the mannequin on a table next to the kiln, hikes up her skirt in order to put her leg back in position, and activates the mechanism to push her into the kiln. As we see the mannequin moving toward the flames we see her face: it’s the living face of the woman. Then, as we see her consigned to the flames, we watch the face melting — it’s the mannequin’s face again.